California Initiative Review (CIR)
Volume 2014

Article 1

1-1-2014

Direct Democracy: A Global Comparative Study
on Electoral Initiative and Referendum
Mechanisms
Patrick Ford
University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law

Tiangay Kemokai
University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/california-initiativereview
Part of the Legislation Commons
Recommended Citation
Ford, Patrick and Kemokai, Tiangay (2014) "Direct Democracy: A Global Comparative Study on Electoral Initiative and Referendum
Mechanisms," California Initiative Review (CIR): Vol. 2014 , Article 1.
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/california-initiative-review/vol2014/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
California Initiative Review (CIR) by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.

Direct Democracy: A Global Comparative Study on
Electoral Initiative and Referendum Mechanisms
Report

Copyright © 2014 by the University of the Pacific,
McGeorge School of Law

By
Patrick Ford
J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2016
B.A., Philosophy, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2010
&
Tiangay Kemokai
J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2015
B.A., Political Science, Oral Roberts University, Tulsa, OK, 2008

I.

INTRODUCTION

This report examines the distinct mechanisms of direct democracy practiced in various
foreign countries. The discussion will begin with a brief definition of direct democracy followed
by the terminology used to describe the various mechanisms. After setting forth a definitional
framework for the discussion, the report will focus on the electoral initiative and referendum as
practiced in Switzerland, the Philippines, Kenya, and Australia, with an emphasis on comparison
to the California model. Finally, this report will provide recommendations for improving the
California initiative system by adopting mechanisms employed by the countries surveyed in this
report.
A. Direct Democracy
In order to properly examine and compare the direct democracy mechanisms in different
countries, it is important to begin with a threshold question: what is direct democracy? Direct
democracy is a system of governance in which citizens make decisions regarding laws and
policies through direct votes rather than delegate the decision-making process solely to elected
representatives. 1
In practice, the direct democracy mechanisms which increase citizen involvement in
policy decisions are mandated “by the constitution or by individual governments through
legislation and through the choice and design of the electoral system.” 2 As such, the mechanisms
of direct democracy vary from country to country. However, this report will focus on two
distinct mechanisms: initiative and referendum. 3
B. Definitions: Initiatives and Referendums
The initiative and referendum are two distinct mechanisms of direct democracy, and the
terminology used to describe these mechanisms may also vary between countries. In addition,
there are various forms of initiatives and referendums. Thus, for the purposes of this report, the
definitions of certain forms of initiatives and referendums are provided below:
Table 1.1 Forms of Initiatives
Initiative (Citizen’s Initiative) 4
• A mechanism of direct democracy by which voters suggest a new statute or
constitutional amendment by gathering signatures to demand a popular vote
• Can be operated Directly or Indirectly

1

See INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE
INTERNATIONAL IDEA HANDBOOK 19 (2008),
http://www.idea.int/publications/direct_democracy/upload/DDH_inlay_low.pdf [“IDEA”].
2
Id. at iv.
3
Please note: this is not an exhaustive study on initiative and referendum mechanisms. As such, the
power of the recall will not be discussed in this report.
4
Initiative, Referendum and Recall, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS., http://www.ncsl.org/research/ electionsand-campaigns/initiative-referendum-and-recall-overview.aspx (last visited September 13, 2014).
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Direct Initiative 5
•

Agenda (Indirect) Initiative 6
•

Citizen proposals are placed directly
onto the ballot and decided by voters

•

Citizen proposals are first considered
by the legislature
May receive a popular vote later in
some systems

Table 1.2 Forms of Referendums
Referendum 7
•

A direct democracy procedure that gives the electorate a direct vote on a specific
political, constitutional or legislative issue.
Forms of Referendums
Definitions

Mandatory Referendum 8

Optional Referendum (Popular Veto) 9
Advisory Referendum (Plebiscites) 10

A direct democracy procedure that is required
for certain government actions; often for
constitutional amendments suggested by the
legislature; used for bond acts in California.
A direct democracy procedure in which the
electorate demands a popular vote on a piece
of legislation.
A direct democracy procedure in which the
legislature initiates a nonbinding popular vote
on an issue of public policy.

The scope of this report is limited to the terminology and the definitions provided in Tables 1.1
and 1.2.
II.

CALIFORNIA’S DIRECT DEMOCRACY SYSTEM

California’s use of direct democracy dates back to 1911, when progressive Governor
Hiram Johnson persuaded the legislature to adopt a system of statewide initiatives and
referendums. 11 This report will examine three particular forms of direct democracy practiced in
California. The initiative process allows citizens to propose statutes or constitutional

5

Direct Democracy: Referendums, THE ELECTORAL KNOWLEDGE NETWORK, http://aceproject.org/aceen/focus/direct-democracy/citizen-initiatives (last visited Sept. 14, 2014).
6
Id.
7
IDEA, supra note 1, at 84.
8
Direct Democracy: Referendums, THE ELECTORAL KNOWLEDGE NETWORK, http://aceproject.org/aceen/focus/direct-democracy/citizen-initiatives (last visited Sept. 14, 2014).
9
Id.
10
Types of Referendums, AUSTRALIAN ELECTORAL COMMISSION,
http://www.aec.gov.au/Elections/referendums/types.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2014).
11
California, INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INSTITUTE, http://iandrinstitute.org/California.htm (last visited
Sept. 13, 2014).
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amendments. 12 Mandatory referendums are a popular vote held to decide on constitutional
amendments originating in the legislature. 13 The optional referendum endows voters with a veto
power by which they can reject a law passed by the legislature. 14 Though this report will not
discuss it, California also uses a system of legislatively referred acts, whereby certain types of
statutes that originate in the legislature must be passed by a popular vote in order to become law.
Any statute that incurs a public debt of $300,000 or greater must be approved in this manner. 15
Most commonly, this method is used to pass water and school bonds, including Proposition 1 on
the November 2014 ballot. 16 Californians also have the power to recall state officials, as
evidenced by the recall of Governor Gray Davis in 2003. 17 These methods of direct democracy
exist for the limited purposes of restricting the legislature’s ability to accrue debts and allowing
voters to remove state officials. Because this report focusses on methods of enacting policy
through law creation, it will not discuss legislatively referred acts or recall elections
A. Legal Framework
The Constitution of California sets forth the steps involved in the initiative process. First,
proponents of an initiative must submit the measure’s text to the California Attorney General,
who will give the initiative an official name and summary. 18 Second, proponents must circulate a
petition requesting that the initiative appear on the statewide ballot. The number of signatures
required to qualify an initiative is based upon the number of votes cast in the last gubernatorial
election: ballot measures that initiate constitutional amendments require eight percent of the most
recent gubernatorial election, whereas initiative statutes or veto referendums require only five
percent. 19 Finally, if an initiative qualifies for the ballot, it will pass with a simple majority of
votes. 20
Moreover, initiatives may not “embrac[e] more than one subject,” and courts are willing
to invalidate initiatives that violate this rule. 21 However, the California Supreme Court has
consistently interpreted the single-subject rule to allow a multi-part initiative, so long as its
provisions are “reasonably germane to a single theme or purpose.” 22 Consequently, extensive
statutory schemes have become law through the initiative process, including the Victims’ Bill of

12

CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8.
Id. art. XVIII, § 4.
14
Id. art. II, § 9.
15
Id. art. XVI, § 1.
16
Sean Creadick & Patrick Lewis, Proposition 1: Water Quality, Supply, and Infrastructure Improvement
Act of 2014, CAL. INIT. REV., (Fall 2014).
17
CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 13–19.
18
Id. art. II, § 10(d).
19
Id. art. II, § 8(b).
20
Id. art. II, § 10(a).
21
Id. art. II, § 8(d); Senate of State of Cal. v. Jones, 21 Cal. 4th 1142, 1168–1169, 988 P.2d 1089, 1105–
1106 (1999) (invalidating an initiative which affected electoral redistricting and the salaries of
legislators).
22
Senate of State of Cal., 21 Cal. 4th at 1163.
13
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Rights in 1982 (Prop 8) and the Political Reform Act of 1974 (Prop 9). 23 Critics have questioned
the value of allowing such large bodies of law to become effective through a popular vote. 24
B. Criticism of California’s Initiative Process
California’s initiative process has been subject to intense criticism. For example, critics
argue that it is too easy to amend the California constitution since only a simple majority of votes
is required to pass an amendment. 25 Because of this low threshold, commentators claim that the
California constitution has become a “bloated mishmash.” 26
Another area of concern is the sheer number of initiatives on the ballot. 27 A large number
of initiatives can lead to voter fatigue, which affects a measure’s outcome based on its position
on the ballot. 28 Similarly, commentators worry that voters who are not well educated about the
content of initiatives are largely casting votes based on the content of paid advertising and
limited news coverage. 29 This is attributable to the fact that many initiatives are complex and
difficult to comprehend. One study found that seventy-eight percent of voters believe that “some
or only a few of the propositions are understandable to most voters.” 30
Critics also point to consistently low voter turnout as a major weakness of California’s
direct democracy system. 31 Initiatives and referendums are intended to represent the will of the
voting public, but this purpose is subverted when only a small percentage of voter actually
participate. 32 Turnout in the June 2014 primary election was only twenty-five percent, and two
ballot initiatives were passed. 33 Arguably, these measures did not receive a strong mandate from
the state’s voters when so few of them actually voted.
Perhaps most disconcerting to critics is the significant role that money plays in the
initiative process. 34 Statistically, the outcome of an initiative campaign is often correlated with
23

California Crime Victims’ Rights, CAL. VICTIM COMPENSATION PROGRAM,
http://vcgcb.ca.gov/victims/rights.aspx (last visited Sept. 13, 2014); Political Reform Division, CAL.
SECRETARY ST., http://www.sos.ca.gov/prd/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2014).
24
Op-Ed Edward L. Lascher et al., It’s Too Easy to Amend California’s Constitution, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4,
2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/04/opinion/oe-hodson4.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Jessica Levinson, Ballot Initiatives Have Harmed California, KCET (Jan. 23, 2012, 10:15 AM),
http://www.kcet.org/ updaily/socal_focus/commentary/would-you-like-to-save-california.html.
28
CHARLENE WEAR SIMMONS, CALIFORNIA’S STATEWIDE INITIATIVE PROCESS 11 (California State
Library 1997) available at https://www.library.ca.gov/CRB/97/06/97006.pdf.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
LEDUC, supra note 31, at 151.
32
Id.
33
Press Release, Cal. Sec’y of State, June Primary Results Certified, Showing Record-Low Turnout and
Record-High Vote-by-Mail Rate (July 11, 2014), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/admin/pressreleases/2014/db14-057.htm.
34
See generally DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED: INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS AND THE POWER OF
MONEY (2000) (detailing the significant influence of special interests upon the initiative process).

197

the amount of money spent by the measure’s proponents and opponents. 35 In particular, a wellfunded opposition can severely limit a proposition’s chances of passing. 36 This inevitably drives
up the cost of a successful campaign in support of a ballot initiative. For instance, even before
an initiative campaign truly begins, the expense of gathering hundreds of thousands of signatures
sets a high price of admission for citizens who want to propose an initiative. One study found
that during the 2012 election, the cost of gathering signatures ranged from $584,126 to
$8,773,490. 37 From the outset, this cost limits the use of the “citizens’ initiative” to well-funded
interests. Despite the criticisms leveled against California’s initiative process, it continues to be
popular with voters. 38
III.

INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM MECHANISMS: A GLOBAL
COMPARATIVE STUDY

This section of the report provides a global comparative study of selected countries with
an aim towards proposing solutions to improve California’s initiative and referendum system.
This comparative study focuses on Switzerland, the Philippines, Kenya, and Australia,
respectively. While there are numerous other countries that authorize direct democracy
mechanisms, these countries provide a diverse cross section of how direct democracy
mechanisms can be used to engage citizens. 39
A. Direct Democracy in Switzerland
1. Legal Framework
The Swiss constitution established four separate mechanisms of direct democracy:
(1) mandatory referendums, where the Swiss parliament seeks permission from the voters to
amend the constitution; (2) initiative constitutional amendment referendums, where the voters
request that a change be made to the constitution; (3) optional referendums, where the voters
decide on a piece of legislation passed by the parliament; and (4) referendums, where the voters
decide whether to ratify an international treaty. 40 Swiss citizens regularly participate in their

35

SIMMONS, supra note 28, at 12.
Id.
37
2012 Ballot Measure Petition Signature Costs, California, BALLOTPEDIA,
http://ballotpedia.org/2012_ballot_measure_petition_signature_costs#California (last visited Sept. 13,
2014).
38
PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., THE CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE PROCESS–HOW DEMOCRATIC IS IT? 2,
available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/op/OP_202XXOP.pdf. A study in 2000 found that seventy
percent of voters approved of the initiative process, with fifty-six percent believing that it is a better way
of making policy decisions than is using the legislature.
39
This report is not an exhaustive study, but rather highlights four countries that have mechanisms of
direct democracy that encompass the initiative and referendum systems as defined in Section I of this
report. See supra Table 1.1 and 1.2.
40
BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 138–42. This paper will focus
on the first three types of referendums because they have the most relevance to the system of initiatives
and referendums that exists in California.
36
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nation’s system of direct democracy. Elections take place between two and four times every
year, with a small number of referendums appearing on the ballot in every election. 41
Under the Swiss constitution, all constitutional amendments must be approved by a
popular vote. 42 An amendment will only take effect if it is approved with a double majority. 43 A
double majority requires that a simple majority of all Swiss voters approve the amendment, as
well as a majority of voters in a majority of the Swiss states (called cantons). 44 This requirement
makes it more difficult for constitutional amendments to become law, and it allows the small
states to place a check on the power of the large states. 45
2. The Agenda Initiative and Referendum Process
The Swiss utilize an agenda initiative system, also known as indirect initiative. 46 Citizens
must collect 100,000 signatures to qualify a constitutional amendment for the ballot. 47 Voter
initiatives come immediately before the legislative body instead of going directly onto the ballot,
and parliament reviews the amendment to ensure that it complies with the law. 48 If the
amendment is defective, it will be disqualified. Otherwise, the legislature may either accept it
and pass it into law or propose an alternative amendment to appear alongside the voter-initiated
amendment on the ballot. 49 After parliament has acted on the amendment, proponents can
abandon the amendment if they are satisfied with parliament’s response or continue to advocate
for the measure if they disagree with parliament. 50 Parliament opposes most constitutional
amendments that originate from the voters. Nevertheless, commentators estimate that about forty
percent of all voter-initiated constitutional amendments result in some type of change to the law,
which is often made through a compromise on the part of the legislature. 51 In this sense, the
Swiss parliament is officially involved in the referendum process.

41

LEDUC, supra note 31, at 154–58.
BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 140, para. 1(a).
43
Id. at art. 142, para. 1–4.
44
Id.
45
RENÉ SCHWOK, SWITZERLAND – EUROPEAN UNION: AN IMPOSSIBLE MEMBERSHIP? 105 (2006),
available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=L8HZoBv4_MAC&printsec=frontcover&dq=inauthor:%22Ren%C3%
A9+Schwok%22&hl=en&sa=X&ei=eIVVIXDAabRiwKsiYCYDQ&ved=0CCgQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false.
46
PHILIP L. DUBOIS, LAWMAKING BY INITIATIVE: ISSUES, OPTIONS AND COMPARISONS 49–50 (1998),
available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=Rq18JkGtj6IC&printsec=frontcover&dq=inauthor:%22Philip+L.+Du
bois%22&hl=en&sa=X&ei=n9kVVPLDAtbjoASTgYH4Bg&ved=0CB8Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=f
alse.
47
BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 138, para. 1.
48
Id. at art. 139, para. 3.
49
Id. at art. 139, para. 4–5. When a parliamentary counterproposal appears on the ballot, Swiss voters will
vote on both the initiative amendment and the counterproposal, and they also indicate which measure they
would prefer, should both measures pass. Id. at art. 139(b), para. 2.
50
DUBOIS, supra note 46, at 51.
51
Id. at 52.
42
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The Swiss initiative and referendum process is similar, in many respects, to the system in
California. 52 Both California and Switzerland require a popular vote to affirm legislative
amendments to the constitution, both allow an optional referendum on statutes passed by the
legislature, and both permit citizens to pass their own constitutional amendments through the
initiative process.
The systems of direct democracy in Switzerland and California diverge in several ways,
perhaps most notably in the use of the agenda initiative. In Switzerland, all voter-initiated
constitutional amendments must go through the parliament before they appear on the ballot. On
the other hand, California uses only the direct system of initiative wherein measures are placed
on the ballot without any useful exposure to the legislative branch. 53 Although the agenda
initiative (indirect initiative) process existed in California until 1966, it was abolished that year
by Proposition 1A. 54
B. Direct Democracy in the Philippines
1. Legal Framework
Article XVII, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines authorizes
constitutional amendments or revisions through the initiative process. Article XVII, Section 2,
states the following:
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number
of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum of the registered votes therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter. The Congress shall
provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. 55
In 1989, the Eighth Congress of the Philippines passed implementing legislation which
set forth a system of initiative and referendum. Republic Act No. 6735, titled “The Initiative and
Referendum Act,” enables the electorate “to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole
or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body.” 56
Section 3 of the Initiative and Referendum Act codifies three distinct forms of direct
democracy. The direct initiative grants “power . . . [to] the people to propose amendments to the
52

Id. at 49.
See CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, Statewide Initiative Guide, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballotmeasures/initiative-guide.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2014) (describing each step of the California initiative
process, which does not require the legislature to consider initiatives); see infra Part IV.B.
54
CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION: GENERAL ELECTION
TUESDAY, NOV. 8, 1966, available at http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1966g.pdf.
Proposition 1A was a legislative constitutional amendment which was submitted to voters through a
mandatory referendum. Id.
55
Id.
56
Rep. Act. No. 6375, § 3.
53
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Constitutions or to propose and enact legislation through an election.” 57 Under the agenda
initiative, the electorate sends a proposition to “Congress or the local legislative body for
action.” 58 Finally, the optional referendum empowers “the electorate to approve or reject
legislation through an election called for that purpose.” 59 Thus, the Philippine statutory scheme
embodies three distinct forms of direct democracy.
2. The Agenda Initiative
Out of the three forms of direct democracy, the agenda initiative is the most divergent
from California’s system of initiative. This form of direct democracy allows the citizens to
submit a proposal that will be considered by Congress or the local legislative body for action as
opposed to a vote by the electorate. California’s initiative system, on the other hand, only permits
initiatives to be placed directly onto the ballot
3. Signature and Distribution Requirements
In the Philippines, the number of signatures required to invoke the power of initiative or
referendum takes into consideration the national and local process by imposing signature and
distribution requirements. For instance, an initiative affecting the 1987 Constitution requires the
signature of at least 12 percent of registered voters of which “every legislative district must be
represented by at least 3 percent of the registered voters.” 60 However, the percentage of
registered voters is reduced by two percentage points when the initiative or referendum is
affecting a law, ordinance, or resolution passed by a legislative assembly of an autonomous
region, province, municipality, or city. In that case, the requirement is 10 percent of registered
voters “of which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3 percent of the
registered voters.” 61 But, “if the city or province is composed of only one legislative district, then
at least each municipality in a province or each barangay 62 in a city should be represented by at
least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.” 63 In a barangay, the signatures of at
the least 10 percent of registered voters is required. 64 Conversely, in California, the signature
requirement is based upon the number of votes cast during the most recent gubernatorial election
which must be equal to 8 percent of the votes cast. 65 A statute or veto referendum only requires 5
percent of the votes cast. 66

57

Id.
Id.
59
Id. § 3.
60
Id. § 5(b).
61
Id. § 5(d).
62
“A unit of administration in Philippine Society consisting of from 50 to 100 families under a headman.”
Barangay Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/barangay (last
visited Sept. 30, 2014).
63
Rep. Act. No. 6375, § 5(d).
64
Id. § 5(f).
65
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b).
66
Id.
58
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Furthermore, the local initiative system imposes a minimum signature requirement that is
different for each of the local government units. 67 Autonomous regions require the signatures of
two thousand registered voters; provinces and cities require the signatures of one thousand
registered voters; municipalities require the signatures of one hundred registered voters; and
barangays require the signatures of fifty registered voters. 68
In order to make comparisons between the local initiative process in the Philippines and
the local initiative process in California, it is important to first compare the Philippine local
system of government to California’s system. The State of California, as a unit of government, is
most comparable to the provinces 69 of the Philippines. 70 The provinces are within regions,
which could be loosely compared to the geographical references used when discussing the
Midwest or Northeast in the United States. 71 On the other hand, autonomous regions are
comparable to US territories and therefore not relevant for comparison. 72
To further compare, within every province there are municipalities and cities. 73 The
municipalities and cities are two distinct units of government. 74 A municipality is a corporate
body acting as a subsidiary of the province within its territorial boundaries, whereas there are
three classifications of cities. 75 The highly urbanized and the independent component cities are
comparable to the concept of chartered cities 76 in California because they function independently
of the province. 77 In contrast, component cities are analogous to general law cities 78 in California
because they are subject to the administrative supervision of the province. 79 Lastly, California
does not have a government unit that is the functional equivalent to a barangay. 80
After outlining a few similarities in the local government structures of the Philippines and
California, there are a few specific comparisons that can be made in regards to the local initiative
process. For example, the local initiative and referendum system in the Philippines can only be

67

Local government units is a term of art that “refers to provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.”
Rep. Act. No. 6375, § 3.
68
Rep. Act. No. 6375, § 13(a).
69
There are 81 provinces in total. Philippines Has a New Province, LOC. GOV’T ACAD. (Jan. 24, 2013),
http://www.lga.gov.ph/update/philippines-has-new-province.
70
Id.
71
Concepts and Definitions: Local Government Units, PHIL. STATS. AUTHORITY (2014),
http://www.nscb.gov.ph/activestats/psgc/articles/con_lgu.asp.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
A charter city has supreme authority over municipal affairs which means it overrides a state law
governing the same topic. LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES, CHARTER CITIES: A QUICK SUMMARY FOR THE PRESS
AND RESEARCHERS, available at http://www.cacities.org/Resources-Documents/ResourcesSection/Charter-Cities/Charter-Cities-A-Quick-Summary-for-the-Press-and-R.
77
See supra note 71.
78
See supra note 76.
79
See supra note 71.
80
See supra note 62.
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exercised once a year, 81 whereas the California system tracks regularly scheduled elections or a
special election can be held. 82 In California, procedural requirements for local initiatives vary
among general law cities, charter cities, and counties. 83 In general-law cites, proponents “must
obtain signatures of 10 percent of registered voters for a measure to appear on the ballot in the
next regularly scheduled election.” 84 The requirement is 15 percent if a special election is
called. 85 However, charter cities have a wide latitude in setting their procedures. As such,
signature requirements range from 5 to 30 percent of registered voters or votes cast in the last
mayoral election. 86 Still, counties require signatures from 10 percent of registered voters or 20
percent if it is a special election. 87 In summary, in California, signature requirements differ for
local measures and initiatives so there are some similarities here. These similarities demonstrate
how the initiative process operates on a local level irrespective of the terms used to describe local
government units.
4. Frequency of Initiatives Amending the Constitution
Along with signature requirements, the Philippine system limits the frequency in which
citizens can exercise the power of initiative as it relates to the 1987 Constitution of the
Philippines. 88 An initiative on the Constitution can only be exercised once every five years. 89
This is not the case in California. The statutory scheme in California does not regulate the
frequency where with an initiative may be put forth to amend the constitution.
C. Kenya
1. Legal Framework
Article 257 of the Constitution of Kenya incorporates several forms of direct democracy.
However, Kenya’s statutory scheme conceptualizes the agenda initiative and referendum system
on an escalating scale from local government, to the national government, and then to the people.
For example, Article 257(1) provides that citizens may propose an amendment to the
Constitution through the initiative process. 90 After the Electoral and Boundaries Commission
reviews the initiative to determine if it satisfies the requirements under Article 257, the
“Commission submits the draft Bill to each county assembly for consideration within three
months.” 91 If the Bill receives approval from the county assemblies it will be submitted to the
Speakers of the two houses of Parliament: the Senate and the National Assembly. 92 The Bill is
81

Rep. Act. No. 6375, § 15(a).
TRACY M. GORDON, THE LOCAL INITIATIVE IN CALIFORNIA 9–10 (Public Policy Institute of California
2004), available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_904TGR.pdf.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 9.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 10.
87
Id.
88
Rep. Act. No. 6375, § 5(b).
89
Id.
90
CONSTITUTION, art. 257(1) (2010) (Kenya).
91
Id. art. 257(5).
92
Id. art. 257(6).
82
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passed into law if it is approved by the majority in both houses of Parliament. 93 But, “if either
House of Parliament fails to pass the Bill, . . . the proposed amendment must be submitted to the
people in a referendum.” 94 Twenty percent of registered voters in at least half of the counties
must vote and a simple majority of citizens must vote in favor of the referendum in order to pass
the proposed amendment. 95 To summarize, the initial stage in the process is illustrative of the
agenda initiative forms of democracy. In Kenya’s statutory scheme, the mandatory referendum
ensures that the proposed amendment does not die in the Houses of Parliament.
Table 3.1

Senate
Proposed
Amendment

Both Houses Pass =
Law

County
Assemblies
National
Assembly

Either House Fails
to Pass =
Referendum

2. Signature Requirements and Distribution Requirements
Kenya’s signature requirements also differ in comparison to the signature requirements
under California’s initiative system. In Kenya, the proposed amendment must be signed by one
million registered voters, regardless of changes to the population or voter registration. 96 With an
estimated 14.3 million registered voters, 97 this is roughly seven percent of the electorate. On the
other hand, signature requirements in CA are expressed as a percentage of the number of votes
cast in the most recent gubernatorial election, with five percent required for initiative statutes and
eight percent required for initiative constitutional amendments. 98 This results in a much smaller
number of signatures being required in California than in Kenya. Since roughly ten million votes
were cast in the 2010 gubernatorial election, the number of signatures required to qualify
initiatives in 2014 were 504,760 and 807,615 for statutes and amendments, respectively. 99 This is
much less than Kenya’s flat-rate requirements of one million signatures. 100 When viewed as a
percentage of registered voters, rather than as a percentage of votes cast for governor,
93

Id. art. 257(8).
Id. art. 257(10).
95
Id. art. 255(2)(1)(a).
96
Id. art. 257(1).
97
Voter Register – (Provisional) 2012, DEEP COGITATION BLOG, http://deepcogitation.com/electionswatch/voter-register-2012/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2014).
98
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b).
99
State Ballot Initiative Guide , CAL. SECRETARY ST., http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballotmeasures/how-to-qualify-an-initiative.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2014).
100
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California’s requirements appear even less demanding. The 504,760 signatures required to
qualify an initiative statute make up less than three percent of California’s roughly seventeen
million registered voters. 101 This is a stark contrast to the seven percent of all registered voters
who must sign ballots to qualify an initiative statute in Kenya. 102 On the other hand, a flat-rate
does have the long-term benefit with population growth of possibly becoming a much lower
threshold.
3. Initiatives and Referendums: Updates and Obstacles
Nevertheless, Kenya may be facing challenges to its system of direct democracy.
Currently, Amendment Bill 2014 seeks to amend provisions governing the referendum. 103 The
Bill proposes to change the threshold required to pass the proposed amendment from twenty
percent of registered voters to forty percent. 104 Moreover, the Bill will now require a
participation quorum, in that at east fifty percent of registered voters must cast their votes in the
referendum. 105 Lastly, the Bill will require that referendums be held only during a general
election of members of parliament. 106
D. Direct Democracy in Australia
1. Legal Framework
The Australian constitution authorizes direct democracy for the sole purpose of
approving constitutional amendments. 107 Australian voters do not have the power to suggest
amendments through the initiative process. 108 In the past, Australia has held national, nonbinding advisory referendums, or plebiscites, on controversial matters. 109 Certain states in
Australia continue to use the advisory referendum today. 110 Only the legislature may initiate an
advisory referendum, and the outcome of these referendums influences the government’s
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policies. 111 Though Australian voters do not have the ability to initiate an advisory referendum,
it is still an opportunity for them to affect government decision-making. Legislatures are likely to
follow the results of an advisory referendum because it can appear arrogant to defy the outcome
of a popular vote. 112
2. Voting and the Referendum Process
The Australian referendum system is unique in that voting is mandatory in all
referendums for citizens over the age of eighteen. 113 Any adult who fails to vote in a national
referendum must present a valid reason for not voting or else pay a small fine. 114 Not
surprisingly, Australia has one of the world’s highest levels of voter turnout, with over ninetythree percent of voters participating in the 2013 parliamentary election. 115
Australian mandatory referendums are also noteworthy because of their relatively low
rate of passage. Of the forty-four national referendums held to decide constitutional amendments,
only eight have passed, which is a success rate of roughly eighteen percent. 116 One reason for
this low rate of passage is Australia’s double majority requirement, which operates on the same
principle as the Swiss model. Any constitutional amendment must receive a simple majority of
the national vote as well as a majority vote in at least four of Australia’s six states. 117
When comparing the systems of direct democracy in Australia and California, the differences
outnumber the similarities. Australians cannot circulate petitions to create new statutes or make
constitutional amendments, 118 which is the cornerstone of the California model. Further,
Australians employ the non-binding referendum, a concept relatively unknown to California
voters. 119 Voting is required in Australia and nearly all adults participate in elections. In contrast,
voting is encouraged in California, but usually less than half of all registered voters cast
ballots. 120 The main similarity between the systems in Australia and California is the use of a
111
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mandatory referendum to amend the constitution. However, even this process is notably
different, with Australia requiring a double majority for amendments to pass.
IV.

LESSONS FROM ABROAD

Sections II and III provide a survey of the electoral initiative and referendum mechanisms
employed by California and select foreign countries. Table 4.1 highlights the various
mechanisms used by each country.
Table 4.1
Country/State Agenda
Initiative
California

Direct

Mandatory

Optional

Advisory

Initiative

Referendum

Referendum

Referendum

X

Switzerland

X*

Philippine

X

Kenya

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

Australia

X

X

* The Swiss system only permits constitutional, as opposed to statutory, initiatives.
The foregoing sections suggest that there are as many ways to implement a system of
direct democracy as there are nations that have such a system. Each of the four nations discussed
has developed mechanisms to effect citizen participation. Consideration of the forms of direct
democracy instituted by other countries can inform a discussion on how California could
improve its own initiative and referendum system. What follows are a few proposals derived
from Switzerland, the Philippines, Kenya, and Australia that California could adopt to address
some of the criticisms raised concerning its initiative and referendum system.
A. Signature and Distribution Requirements
In order to blunt the criticism that the low threshold required to pass a constitutional
amendment results in a constitution that is a “bloated mishmash,” 121 implementing a distribution
requirement may make it more difficult to pass a constitutional amendment. Mirroring the
Philippines’ system would require a specified percentage of signatures from each county in
California in order for the initiative to appear on the ballot. This would ensure proportional
representation, thereby making it more arduous to amend the constitution. 122 In addition,
Kenya’s model, which requires approval from county assemblies, could provide further
assurance that the measure has support throughout the state.
121
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B. Agenda Initiatives (Indirect Initiatives)
A reintroduction of the agenda initiative could help curb the expense of signature
gathering in California’s initiative process. 123 An often cited disadvantage of California’s
initiative process is the exorbitant costs to carry an initiative from the signature gathering phase
to statewide approval. 124 Modeled after the Swiss system, the agenda initiative could be a costeffective alternative to the direct initiative because it requires fewer signatures. As soon as an
initiative garners a sufficient number of signatures, the legislature would be required to consider
the proposal. For some initiatives, this could result in a purely legislative solution, sparing
proponents the costs of a full-scale campaign. However, if dissatisfied with the legislature’s
response, the proponents of the initiative would still have the option to take the measure to a
statewide vote.
In addition, the agenda initiative may result in a more educated electorate. 125
Comparatively, when Swiss voters propose a constitutional amendment through the agenda
initiative process, the Federal Assembly must formally consider the initiative before it can be
placed on the ballot. This aspect of the Swiss system can result in a more in-depth conversation
between the government and the people. When the parliament makes a counterproposal, Swiss
voters often prefer the parliament’s counterproposal to the original initiative. 126 This indicates
that the agenda initiative process can yield legislative solutions that are satisfactory to Swiss
voters. Both the increased flexibility of the Swiss initiative process and the wider array of
proposals from which voters may choose seem to justify the use of the agenda initiative. While
the California legislature is required to convene “informational hearings” about the propositions
that will appear on the ballot, these hearings are not widely covered by the media, and thus have
little effect on the public debate. 127 As such, reintroducing the agenda initiative could spur
dialogue between the legislature and the electorate.
Another feature of the agenda initiative that could also help to increase statewide
representation of the electorate is demonstrated by the system implemented in Kenya. This
system incorporates a multi-layered-legislative participation. In other words, county assemblies
must approve the initiative before it goes to both Houses of Parliament. If this system were
implemented in California, presumably, the initiative process would require understanding of
local needs rather than a statewide focus.
Nevertheless, a reintroduction of the agenda initiative could meet political resistance
because the initiative process has taken on the distinctive character of “California’s fourth branch
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of government.” 128 The notion of the legislature participating in the initiative process could strike
voters as a power grab, contravening the original purpose of the initiative as a route around a
legislative body beholden to special interests. 129 Even though any proposal rejected by the
legislature would necessarily be subjected to a popular vote, voters may be hesitant to include the
legislature in a method of lawmaking that historically has been the exclusive domain of the
people.
C. The Double Majority Requirement
The Double Majority Requirement, as exercised in Switzerland and Australia, could also
help to address the concern that it is too easy to amend the California constitution. 130 Under the
Swiss and Australian constitutions, all amendments must be passed in a national referendum by a
double majority. This is not the case in California, where a statewide simple majority is
sufficient to pass legislative and initiative constitutional amendments.
Implementing the double majority rule in California would require all amendments to be
passed by a majority of voters in the state, as well as by voters in a majority of California’s
counties. Again, this would make it more difficult for constitutional amendments to pass.
Further, in order to pass an amendment, it would have to garner wide support across the state, not
merely a strong voting base in one region. Thus, the double majority requirement would have the
dual effect of insulating the constitution from excessive amendments while mandating a more
widespread consensus on proposed amendments.

D. Shorter and More Concise Initiatives
In answer to the criticism that initiatives are difficult to comprehend, 131 California could
mandate that initiatives be shorter and more concise. By comparison, Swiss initiatives are
usually shorter in length than those that exist in California. 132 The primary reason for this
difference is that the Swiss enforce a strict single-subject rule that applies to all initiatives. 133
Though California has a similar rule, courts have interpreted it to allow large statutory schemes
to qualify as a single subject. 134
To make initiatives more understandable, California could adopt a strict limit on the
length of ballot initiatives. Though Switzerland does not have any such limitation, the rule would
bring California’s initiatives more in line with the shorter proposals that appear on Swiss ballots.
Alternatively, voters could pass an initiative that redefines the single subject rule, making it
128
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much narrower. This could force initiative proponents to focus their proposal on one statute or
constitutional provision, which would make it much easier for voters to comprehend the effect of
the initiative by reading its text.
E. Advisory Referendums (Non-binding)
The introduction of a non-binding referendum would allow voters to weigh in on a
greater number of important issues, while at the same time addressing the concern that there is an
excessive number of initiatives on the ballot. 135 If the legislature were able to call a non-binding
vote on specific policy matters, it could have the effect of reducing the number of initiative
campaigns brought by voters. The political cover provided by a popular vote would encourage
the legislature to address “hot-button issues.”
The advisory referendum could also be adapted to the initiative process, whereby citizens
could gather signatures to request a statewide advisory vote on a particular issue. 136 Since the
results of such a vote would be non-binding, it would be more acceptable to lower the number of
signatures required to qualify the measure for the ballot. This would enable citizens to call a vote
on important policy matters without incurring the full financial burden of gathering the 400,000
signatures required to qualify a legislative initiative. 137 Also, there is no danger of voters passing
unconstitutional or ambiguous laws. The results of a non-binding initiative would merely serve
as a mandate to legislators to take action on a particular issue.
Proponents of Proposition 49 in 2014 attempted to call an advisory vote to denounce the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. The California
Supreme Court removed Proposition 49 from the ballot, holding that, under current law, it is
unclear whether advisory questions may be the subject of popular initiatives. 138 In order for
advisory referendums to become part of California’s system of direct democracy, voters would
need to amend the state constitution to explicitly allow for such a vote.
F. Improving Voter Turnout
Low voter turnout is often cited as a concern for the California initiative process. 139
California could improve its initiative process by implementing methods to increase voter
turnout. An initiative statute, which is supposedly the will of California voters, loses legitimacy
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when it is passed by just a small segment of the state’s voters. For example, the 2014 primary
election saw only twenty-five percent of California’s registered voters participate. 140 This figure
contrasts sharply with the high rate of turnout in Australia, which has not fallen below ninety
percent voter turnout since mandatory voting was instituted in 1924.141 Thus, it is arguable that
referendums in Australia better represent public sentiment since they are decided by a much
wider segment of voters.
Mandatory voting is not a palatable solution to voter-turnout problems in California or
any other state in America. However, a more realistic method to increase voter turnout would be
to set a minimum level of voter participation, or participation quorum, required for a proposition
to take effect. 142 As discussed, Kenya is currently considering the implementation of a quorum
requirement that would prevent any referendum from taking effect unless fifty percent of eligible
voters cast a vote in the referendum. It is important to note that 55 percent of eligible California
voters participated in the 2012 presidential election, and 59 percent in 2008. 143 Thus, a 50
percent participation requirement would not banish propositions from California politics. It
would, however, pressure proponents to campaign for initiatives only in presidential election
years. Consequently, more voters would be deciding the outcomes of initiatives and referendums
which could have profound effects on the state.
G. Frequency of Initiatives
Yet another solution to the criticism that the constitution of California is amended too
often is to reduce the frequency with which citizens may initiate a constitutional amendment.
Similar to the Philippines, California could regulate the initiative process to limit citizen-initiated
amendments to once every four years. This could have the effect of decreasing the number of
initiatives and fostering a more deliberative democracy, in that citizens would be required to live
with their proposed amendments for a longer period of time before voting on them. In addition, if
initiatives only appeared in presidential elections, the initiative process would benefit from the
considerably higher levels of voter turnout seen in these elections. 144
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V.

CONCLUSION

There are numerous systems of direct democracy implemented throughout the world. The
initiative and referendum, as practiced in Switzerland, the Philippines, Kenya, and Australia,
offer useful comparisons to California’s initiative and referendum system because they encounter
some of the same problems faced in California. Helpful techniques that are already used abroad,
such as the double majority requirement, advisory and indirect initiatives, frequency limitations,
and signature distribution requirements, could be put to constructive use in California. By
learning how others have approached similar problems, California voters can carry on a more
informed discussion of how to improve their own system of direct democracy.
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